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 BACKGROUND:  Successful management of a pandemic or disaster requires implementation of 
preexisting plans to minimize loss of life and maintain control. Managing the expected surges 
in intensive care capacity requires strategic planning from a systems perspective and includes 
focused intensive care abilities and requirements as well as all individuals and organizations 
involved in hospital and regional planning. Th e suggestions in this article are important for all 
involved in a large-scale disaster or pandemic, including front-line clinicians, hospital admin-
istrators, and public health or government offi  cials. Specifi cally, this article focuses on surge 
logistics—those elements that provide the capability to deliver mass critical care. 
 METHODS:  Th e Surge Capacity topic panel developed 23 key questions focused on the following 
domains: systems issues; equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals; staffi  ng; and informatics. 
Literature searches were conducted to identify studies upon which evidence-based recommen-
dations could be made. Th e results were reviewed for relevance to the topic, and the articles 
were screened by two topic editors for placement within one of the surge domains noted previ-
ously. Most reports were small scale, were observational, or used fl awed modeling; hence, the 
level of evidence on which to base recommendations was poor and did not permit the develop-
ment of evidence-based recommendations. Th e Surge Capacity topic panel subsequently fol-
lowed the American College of Chest Physicians (CHEST) Guidelines Oversight Committee’s 
methodology to develop suggestion based on expert opinion using a modifi ed Delphi process. 
 RESULTS:  Th is article presents 22 suggestions pertaining to surge capacity mass critical care, 
including requirements for equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals; staff  preparation and 
organization; methods of mitigating overwhelming patient loads; the role of deployable critical 
care services; and the use of transportation assets to support the surge response. 
 CONCLUSIONS:  Critical care response to a disaster relies on careful planning for staff  and 
resource augmentation and involves many agencies. Maximizing the use of regional resources, 
including staff , equipment, and supplies, extends critical care capabilities. Regional coalitions 
should be established to facilitate agreements, outline operational plans, and coordinate hos-
pital eff orts to achieve predetermined goals. Specialized physician oversight is necessary and 
if not available on site, may be provided through remote consultation. Triage by experienced 
providers, reverse triage, and service deescalation may be used to minimize ICU resource 
consumption. During a temporary loss of infrastructure or overwhelmed hospital resources, 
deployable critical care services should be considered. 
  CHEST 2014;  146 ( 4_Suppl ): e17S - e43S 
 ABBREVIATIONS :  MCC 5  mass critical care 
 [   Evidence-Based Medicine    ] 
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 Summary of Suggestions 
 Stockpiling of Equipment, Supplies, and 
Pharmaceuticals 
 1. We suggest hospital support services, including 
pharmacy, laboratory, radiology, respiratory therapy, 
and nutrition services, also be included in the plan-
ning of critical care surge. 
 2. We suggest equipment, supplies, and pharmaceu-
tical stockpiles specifi c to the delivery of mass 
critical care (MCC) be interoperable and compatible 
at the regional level and ideally at the state/provin-
cial level, so as to ensure uniformity of response 
capabilities, coordinated training, and a mechanism 
for exchange of material among facilities. 
 3. We suggest facilities should ensure adequate 
availability of disaster supplies through facility-based 
caches, with vendor agreements and understanding of 
supply chain resources and limitations. 
 4. We suggest the existing MCC hospital target lists 
for basic equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals 
remain relevant for institutions seeking to plan for 
MCC response. 
 5. We suggest regional and hospital stockpiles include 
equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals that can be 
used to accommodate the needs of unique popula-
tions that are likely to require critical care in centers 
other than specialty care centers, including pediatric, 
burn, and trauma patients. 
 Staff  Preparation and Organization 
 6. We suggest hospitals use adaptive measures to 
compensate for reduced staffi  ng, such as additional 
shift s, workload, and changes in shift  structure/time, 
should be planned in collaboration with the critical 
care staff  representatives. 
 7. We suggest hospital staff  preparation for response 
to a disaster is vitally important to the successful 
outcomes of such events and should include emphasis 
on role defi nition, integration with the incident 
command system, and the ability to perform cross-
trained functions. 
 8. We suggest hospital staff  preparedness to support 
critical care surge response include knowledge of the 
following: standard operating procedures, role 
defi nition, use of hospital incident command system, 
cross-training of additional staff , and training in the 
use of situational awareness tools, particularly those 
that can assist in decision-making regarding critical 
care surge planning, operations, response, and 
recovery. 
 9. We suggest once a disaster or pandemic has 
occurred, hospitals should implement measures to 
mitigate preventable causes of staff  shortage, including 
sheltering of staff  and their families, provision of 
mental health support, measures to mitigate fatigue, 
access to transportation services, and maintenance of 
a safe working environment. 
 10. We suggest critical care nurse-to-patient ratios in 
an event requiring critical care surge be determined 
by provider experience, available support (ancillary 
staff ), and clinical demands. 
 11. During a disaster or pandemic, we suggest 
critical care physician oversight and direction of 
the clinical care teams who provide critical care 
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services, includ ing scheduled patient assessment 
and treatment plan evaluation. If direct oversight 
is unavailable, a means of remote consultation 
should be used. 
 12. Should expert consultation (eg, pediatrics, 
trauma, burn, or critical care) not be available locally, 
we suggest every eff ort be made by hospitals to ensure 
that such expertise be provided at a minimum 
through remote consultation. 
 13. We suggest hospitals consider the utilization of 
technology (eg, telemedicine) as an important adjunct 
to the delivery of critical care services in a disaster 
to serve as a force multiplier to support response to 
disaster events. Where no such systems are currently 
in place, development of a telemedicine or other 
electronic platform to support patient care delivery 
is suggested. 
 Patient Flow and Distribution 
 14. We suggest decisions regarding in-hospital 
placement of critically ill patients during an MCC 
(aft er initial survey and treatment) be performed by 
an experienced clinician who makes similar triage 
decisions on a daily basis. 
 15. Early discharge of ICU patients to the general 
ward is a complex process, requiring critical care 
expertise. To enable rapid admission of critically ill 
patients to the ICU immediately aft er termination of 
ED/operating room workup and treatment, we 
suggest discharge of ICU patients (when possible) 
during preparation for an impending MCC be given 
priority simultaneous to decisions made about initial 
ED patient distribution. 
 Deployable Critical Care Services 
 16. We suggest deployable critical care services be 
considered a temporary alternative to critical care 
when loss of hospital infrastructure limits provision 
of critical care. 
 17. We suggest deployable critical care services 
are not defi nitive critical care facilities but may be 
used as a temporizing measure for delivery of 
critical care in a disaster setting. Expansion of 
critical care resources in the hospital environment, 
with temporary facilities for lesser acuity patients, is 
preferred over provision of deployable critical care 
when possible . 
 18. We suggest deployable critical care services may 
serve as temporary critical care locations provided 
there is a clear plan for patient transfer, within a few 
hours to days, to a defi nitive treatment location. 
 19. In crisis surge response, we suggest less intensive 
treatment of moderately injured patients be priori-
tized over the deployment of temporary critical care 
services when it would result in improved outcomes 
for larger numbers of patients. 
 Using Transportation Assets to Support Surge 
Response 
 20. We suggest surge capacity plans include predeter-
mined standards that defi ne minimal ongoing critical 
care capability in order to defi ne the framework for 
decisions regarding patient transfer as the demands 
on the system gradually increase during a disaster or 
pandemic. 
 21. We suggest priority be given to transfer of assets to 
patients, particularly when transfer of patients to 
defi nitive care is limited by dangerous conditions 
(including considerable risk posed by available 
transportation options). 
 22. Transportation used for patient evacuations 
may also be used to bring in assets (eg, specialty 
providers and equipment), particularly when 
access/transport capacity is the limiting factor in 
patient movement. 
 Introduction 
 Successful management of a disaster or pandemic 
requires implementation of preexisting plans to mini-
mize loss of life and prevent event expansion and 
secondary illness and injury. Th ese plans are strategic 
documents and policies that should be developed in 
preparation for a surge during a disaster or pandemic 
and should be accompanied by rigorous training to 
ensure best outcomes. Many facilities do not incorporate 
critical care in their disaster plans or have critical care 
expansion plans that are separate from their all-hazard 
response plan. However, critical care is an important 
component of the hospital response to a disaster,  1 - 3  and 
managing surges in the ICU cannot be accomplished in 
isolation. A systems perspective, which includes all the 
organizations and persons involved as well as intensive 
care, is necessary. Planning should take into account the 
12 disaster scenarios most likely to involve large 
numbers of critically ill or injured patients as outlined 
by the US Department of Homeland Security National 
Preparedness Guidelines.  4  Critical care surge capacity is 
defi ned as the maximal number of critical casualties that 
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can receive adequate critical care for as long as 
required, regardless of patient placement, aft er recruit-
ing all critical care assets. In a companion article in this 
guideline, we examine issues related to surge opera-
tions, describing the conduct of mass critical care 
(MCC).  5  Th e suggestions in this article are important 
for all who are involved in a disaster or pandemic with 
multiple critically ill patients, including frontline 
clinicians, hospital administrators, and public health 
or government offi  cials. Although it is important for 
all providers to be familiar with all aspects of surge 
capacity logistics,  Table 1 provides an overview of the 
suggestions of most interest to various stakeholders. In 
this article, we specifi cally focus on surge logistics: the 
elements that provide the capability to deliver MCC in 
disaster events ( Table 2 ). 
 Materials and Methods 
 Th e Surge Capacity topic group met in June 2012 and developed 23 key 
questions focused on the following domains: systems issues; equipment, 
supplies, and pharmaceuticals; staffi  ng; and informatics. Four literature 
searches were conducted to identify studies upon which evidence-based 
recommendations could be made. Searches were limited to between 
January 1995 and October 2012; English-language articles were included 
and non-English-language articles excluded (e-Appendix 1). A total 
of 1,440 articles were identifi ed. Th e articles were reviewed for rele-
vance to the topic by two topic editors (S. E. and J. L. H.). Th e lead topic 
editor (D. H.) was responsible for “deconfl icting” the results where 
initial consensus was not achieved. Seven hundred twenty-seven arti-
cles were deemed relevant to the subject of surge capacity planning and 
response. Most reports were small scale, were observational, or used 
fl awed or limited modeling; hence, the level of evidence on which to 
base recommendations was poor and did not permit the development 
of evidence-based recommendations. Th e Surge Capacity topic panel 
subsequently followed the American College of Chest Physicians 
(CHEST) Guidelines Oversight Committee’s methodology to develop 
suggestions based on expert opinion through a modified Delphi 
process .  8   e-Appendix 1 contains key questions, key suggestions, and 
corresponding search terms and results. 
 Results 
 Stockpiling of Equipment, Supplies, and 
Pharmaceuticals 
 1. We suggest hospital support services, including 
pharmacy, laboratory, radiology, respiratory therapy, 
and nutrition services, also be included in the plan-
ning of critical care surge. 
 2. We suggest equipment, supplies, and pharmaceu-
tical stockpiles specifi c to the delivery of MCC be 
interoperable and compatible at the regional level, 
and ideally at the state/provincial level, so as to ensure 
uniformity of response capabilities, coordinated 
training, and a mechanism for exchange of material 
among facilities. 
 3. We suggest facilities should ensure adequate 
availability of disaster supplies through facility-
based caches, with vendor agreements and 
understanding of supply chain resources and 
limitations. 
 4. We suggest the existing MCC hospital target lists 
for basic equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals 
remain relevant for institutions seeking to plan for 
MCC response. 
 5. We suggest regional and hospital stockpiles include 
equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals that can be 
used to accommodate the needs of unique popula-
tions that are likely to require critical care in centers 
other than specialty care centers, including pediatric, 
burn, and trauma patients. 
 Policies should enable programs to optimize critical care 
resources available to a hospital. Th e existing framework 
for optimizing resources includes substitution, conser-
vation, use of less-resource-intensive therapies, and, in 
the worst-case scenario, reuse or reallocation of scarce 
resources.  5  Stockpiling of equipment, supplies, and 
pharmaceuticals prior to a disaster or pandemic 
increases hospital surge capacity. A current focus on 
just-in-time inventory management limits stockpiling 
and requires constant vigilance and advocacy to ensure 
that key supplies are available. Th us, the development 
and oversight of equipment, supplies, and pharmaceu-
tical stockpiles to deliver MCC is an integral function of 
local, regional, state or province, or national health-care 
emergency management programs. Th e ability to deliver 
eff ective critical care hinges on the maintenance of 
adequate supplies of narcotics, sedatives, antibiotics, 
vascular access supplies, and laboratory reagents that 
oft en are targeted for reduced stocking. Regional 
discussions of stockpiling based on the hazards faced by 
the community are central to the planning process. A 
coordinated approach to planning, purchasing, and 
stockpiling can lead to a much more robust and eff ective 
response than any single-facility eff orts. Mechanisms for 
coordination of supply and staff  during an event are 
detailed in the “Surge Capacity Principles” article by 
Hick et al  5  in this consensus statement. Regional stock-
piles of critical medical supplies (particularly those used 
routinely and those that are likely to be required before 
outside supplies can arrive) at multiple medical facilities 
can be used to enhance critical care surge preparedness.  9  
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 Critical care surge capabilities rely on support from 
pharmacy, laboratory, radiology, respiratory therapy, 
and nutrition services; hence, these should be included 
in all plans. Critical care experts should discuss with 
their pharmacy and central supply the quantities that 
should be readily available and determine arrangements 
should these supplies become exhausted.  10  Up to 
one-fi ft h of the patients admitted to hospitals aft er a 
major disaster may present with respiratory complica-
tions  11 , 12  ; thus, respiratory care should also be involved 
in the institutional plans for operating a signifi cantly 
greater number of ventilators than usual. Similarly, 
pharmacy and radiology usual practices may be altered 
during disasters, and laboratories may need to limit 
routine services to focus on critical testing.  13 - 16  
 Health-care facilities should also have local plans to 
institute substitution, conservation, adaptation, reuse, 
and reallocation of scarce resources.  17 , 18  For drugs, these 
plans may require input from pharmacists and specialist 
clinicians. For example, infectious disease specialists 
may need to work in concert with pharmacists when 
antibiotic substitution or conservation strategies are 
contemplated.  19 - 22  
 Successful implementation of conservation strategies 
relies on education and training as well as on prepara-
tion. For example, conservation of oxygen depends on 
implementation of standard operating procedures 
regarding the indications for supplemental oxygen and 
training to target oxygen saturation to  . 89% rather 
than to  . 95% as well as on the choice of liquid oxygen 
and compression-driven ventilators.  23  Inconsistent or 
even confl icting approaches can be avoided if national 
societies or bodies, such as the US Food and Drug 
Administration, provide basic templates and guidance 
so that individual institutions are not required to 
conduct these eff orts independently. 
 Individual hospitals can optimize the use of stockpiled 
equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals if systems for 
pre-event preparation, cache monitoring, updating, and 
oversight and coordination policies during an event are 
used.  18  In general, the existing target lists of ancillary 
equipment for surge positive pressure ventilation ( Table 3 ), 
medical equipment for critical care surge ( Table 4 ), and 
pharmaceuticals ( Table 5 ) remain relevant for institu-
tions seeking to plan for pandemic and disaster 
response.  17 , 18 , 25  Similar target lists for pediatric critical 
care surge can be found in a dedicated article by the 
Task Force for Pediatric Emergency Mass Critical Care.  24  
 Mechanical Ventilation Surge:  Ventilatory support is 
an absolute necessity for survival in critically ill patients 
and may be the single most important therapy that 
dictates outcome. Moreover, ventilators are expensive 
and likely to be the limiting factor in any hospital’s 
ability to accommodate a large MCC surge. Currently, 
US hospitals own approximately 65,000 full-feature 
ventilators and 100,000 less-advanced ventilators  26  to 
serve 93,955 ICU beds.  27  Hospitals working individually 
are unlikely to have enough ventilators stockpiled to 
double their ventilatory capacity in accordance with crisis 
surge requirements. Vendors will also be unable to supply 
a large number of ventilators on short notice. We suggest 
that health-care coalition surge objectives be consistent 
with individual hospital surge goals  5  and include the 
capability to surge at least up to the limit of the total 
number of ventilators available to coalition partners.  28  
 A practical solution to this shortfall is to undertake a 
regional count of ventilators and a map of ventilation 
capacity per zone. A region’s MCC operational plan 
would be built around that map, which outlines 
 TABLE 1 ]  Primary Target Audiences for Suggestions 







 1 9  
 2 9 
 3 9  
 4 9  
 5 9 9 
 6 9 9  
 7 9 9  
 8 9 9  
 9 9 9  
 10 9 9  
 11 9 9  
 12 9 9 
 13 9  
 14 9 9  
 15 9 9  
 16 9  
 17 9  
 18 9  
 19 9  
 20 9  
 21 9  
 22 9  
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 TABLE 2 ]  An Overview of the Critical Care Surge Planning Process 
 Process 
 Key elements 
 1. Management 
 2. Human resources 
 3. Alternative physical spaces 
 4. Equipment and technology 
 5. Processes for surge 
 Key principles 
 1. Central authority 
 2. Readiness to act for all categories of surge 
 3. Response built on partnerships 
 4. Tiered escalation response 
 5. Operational capabilities will be scalable, fl exible, and adaptable 
 Objectives and critical tasks 
 1. Establish a steering committee 
  Identify a senior management sponsor as well as at least one champion from all key hospital stakeholders 
    (eg, medicine, nursing administration, ED, ICU, unions). 
 2. Establish a critical care surge resource team 
  Identify a physician gatekeeper to cochair the steering committee with the executive who will lead and be 
    accountable for managing surge events with support from a resource team comprising representatives from 
ICU nursing leadership and frontline staff . 
 3. Complete a comprehensive hospital assessment 
  Map patient fl ow through the hospital, monitor patient fl ow through the hospital, track surge events when they 
    occur, and track access to critical care. Use all these data to understand the system and provide feedback to 
hospital areas to drive improvement. 
 4. Conduct a campaign to educate the organization about surge 
  For a surge plan to be eff ective, it is critical for the entire organization to understand the process and its role in 
    managing surge. 
 5. Establish a critical care communication system 
  Implement a traffi  c light system that communicates patient status: green (ready for ICU discharge), yellow (possible 
    discharge in 24-36 h), red (ongoing life support required). ICU patient status should be updated at least bid. This 
improves fl ow by enabling planning by all clinicians involved and allows for easy identifi cation of patients for ICU 
discharge through reverse triage if a sudden surge event occurs. 
 6. Identify essential services and functions required to sustain the critical care service 
  This involves understanding the key activities required to admit, care for, and discharge patients from the ICU in 
    addition to identifying potential alternate areas with the functionality to permit critical care in the event of a surge. 
 7. Develop a resilient human resources system 
  This process is aimed at developing a robust human resources network to provide critical care during a surge and 
    includes maintaining a staff  inventory based on skill set, cross-training critical care extenders, and planning how 
to staff  during surges. 
 8. Planning to use alternate spaces during a surge 
  Merely identifying alternate spaces where critical care can be provided will not be eff ective. A concrete policy and 
    plan (and agreements with the aff ected area) must be in place to allow this to be executed. 
 9. Planning for surge equipment and supply needs 
  The delivery of critical care outside of the ICU requires equipment and supplies that are not usually available in most 
    areas outside the ICU. Ideally, prestocked carts with ICU supplies (with or without any additional equipment 
required) are created and can easily be moved into the alternate space to quickly prepare the area for providing 
critical care. Prestocked carts also enable the ICU staff  to be familiar with the supplies and equipment they will 
have in advance of deployment to an unfamiliar work environment. 
(Continued)
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 Process 
 10. Developing a decantation process 
  In moderate or major surges, it may be necessary to deescalate services and decant the hospital and ICU to 
    facilitate new ICU admissions. It is essential that a plan about how to undertake a decant, including establishing 
partnerships with community groups such as home care, nursing homes, and transportation services, is in place. 
 11. Understand how patient volumes in noncritical care aff ect the ICU 
  ICUs are not islands unto themselves in the health-care system. Therefore, it is important for ICU leaders to 
    understand both how other services (eg, surgery) aff ect the ICU and how the function of the ICU aff ects other 
hospital services and their targets and priorities. 
 12. Evaluation, exercises, and reassessments 
  Having established the hospital’s surge plan and process, hospitals must have an ongoing evaluation of how it 
    functions during common minor surges in order to refi ne the system, exercises for moderate and major surges to 
test the plan, and a process to reassess the plans at regular intervals to update them when planning assumptions 
or when critical enablers change. 
 (Adapted from Christian et al  6  and the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care.  7  ) 
TABLE 2 ] (continued)
shortfalls and target goals for the regional ventilator 
stockpile. With clear targets, hospitals and coalitions will 
likely be motivated to stockpile ventilators to meet these 
goals. Th us, facilities should fi rst assess their capacity to 
use anesthesia machines, noninvasive ventilation 
machines, and transport ventilators for potential 
redeployment. Although simple pressure-triggered 
ventilators may play some role when lung compliance is 
normal, in most disasters and pandemics, they will be of 
very limited utility.  29  Stockpiled mechanical ventilators 
must meet unique needs, which should be considered 
before selection ( Table 6 ). 
 Facilities should also map their ability to provide 
mechanical ventilatory support. Th e fi rst question is 
which hospital areas are capable of supporting mechan-
ical ventilation: Th e availability of physical space, air and 
oxygen supply, expired gas clearance, and negative 
pressure for suction should all be examined. Th e second 
question is whether the hospital infrastructure is capable 
of supporting the planned surge. Th e existing infrastruc-
ture should be studied not only in terms of the power 
requirements and oxygen supply but also in light of the 
most likely regional hazards. For example, during 
Hurricane Katrina, hospitals suff ered generator power 
outages  30  and had to move ancillary departments (eg, 
biomedical engineering, central supplies) because their 
location had exposed them to fl ooding.  31  During the 
Lebanon war, a hospital within the missile striking zone 
had to convert ED areas into operating rooms because 
the latter were not designed to withstand artillery and 
missile attack.  32  
 Mechanical ventilation of a patient places implicit 
constraints on the system; it is highly demanding in 
terms of staff  (both time and training), equipment, and 
consumable supplies. Depending on the type of disaster 
or pandemic, the surge of mechanical ventilation is 
expected to last at least several weeks.  33 - 36  Initiation of 
mechanical ventilation during a pandemic or disaster is 
a weighty decision. Once initiated, withdrawal of 
ventilation, although ethically defensible, may be legally 
challenging,  37 , 38  depending on the jurisdiction. Th ose 
making decisions to intubate patients during an MCC 
event should be aware of the immediate and long-term 
implications of their decisions  39  and seek alternative 
options where possible.  40  Decisions regarding manual 
ventilation should be made per event and should take 
into account the time and physical costs of manual 
ventilation, the inherent risk of close contact with the 
patient for the staff , ventilator and staff  availability and 
training, and the time manual ventilation is likely to be 
required. 
 Staff  Preparation and Organization 
 6. We suggest hospitals use adaptive measures to 
compensate for reduced staffi  ng, such as additional 
shift s, workload, and changes in shift  structure/time, 
should be planned in collaboration with the critical 
care staff  representatives. 
 Delivery of critical care depends on the availability 
of suffi  ciently trained medical, nursing, and ancillary 
staff . Because acute care hospitals operate around the 
clock, the available personnel may be doubled or even 
tripled rapidly through recruitment of off -shift  staff . Th is 
arrangement generally suffi  ces for treatment of the 
initial wave of patients. However, a continued response 
is likely to consume the available reserves of rested 
personnel within 24 to 48 h. Because the critical care 
needs in a disaster or pandemic are more prolonged 
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than the response in other sections of the hospital,  4 , 5 , 41 - 44  
the likelihood of depleting staff  reserves is greater in the 
ICU. Planning ahead for phased staff  callbacks (eg, 
staged callbacks when a disaster is declared so that all 
staff  do not respond at once) and automatic consider-
ation of staffi  ng needs for 12, 24, and 48 h postevent to 
determine need and coverage and make appropriate 
plans (eg, notifying patients of clinic closures and 
rescheduling to allow staff  to provide inpatient care) can 
greatly facilitate safe and eff ective coverage for the 
duration of the surge. 
 Preparation:  
 7. We suggest hospital staff  preparation for response 
to a disaster is vitally important to the successful 
outcomes of such events and should include emphasis 
on role defi nition, integration with the incident 
command system, and the ability to perform cross-
trained functions. 
 8. We suggest hospital staff  preparedness to support 
critical care surge response include knowledge of the 
following: standard operating procedures, role 
defi nition, use of hospital incident command system, 
cross-training of additional staff , and training in the 
use of situational awareness tools, particularly those 
that can assist in decision-making regarding critical 
care surge planning, operations, response, and 
recovery. 
 9. We suggest once a disaster or pandemic has 
occurred, hospitals should implement measures to 
mitigate preventable causes of staff  shortage, includ-
ing sheltering of staff  and their families, provision of 
mental health support, measures to mitigate fatigue, 
access to transportation services, and maintenance of 
a safe working environment. 
 Adaptive measures to compensate for reduced staffi  ng, 
such as additional shift s, workload, transition-to-care 
teams, and changes in shift  structure, should be planned 
in collaboration with the critical care staff  ( Table 7 ). 
Routine services that aff ect the ability to eff ectively 
respond to the pandemic or disaster (eg, elective 
surgery, clinic services) can be curtailed in order to 
reassign staff  to pandemic- or disaster-relevant duties.  32  
New divisions of labor may be required and should be 
based on the skill sets required rather than traditional 
roles or functions of providers. Th e use of care teams, 
that is, combinations of providers who cumulatively 
possess the required skill set, should be considered.  17 , 25 , 45  
Additionally, administrative and teaching responsibil-
ities should be curtailed during surge operations 
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 TABLE 5 ]  Suggested Pharmaceuticals 
 Preventive Therapeutics Acute Care Event Specifi c 
 DVT prophylaxis IV fl uid solutions Chemical (activated charcoal, atropine, 
  pralidoxime, silver sulfadiazine, GCSF, 
pupillary dilators, etc) 
 GI hemorrhage prophylaxis Nutrition Antivirals steroids (topical, systemic) 
 Treatment of reactive bronchospasm 
  (inhalational agents)
Antibiotics  
 Infection control (ie, antiseptics) Vasopressors  
 Vaccines (tetanus, hepatitis) Sedatives  
 Eye care Analgesics  
 Oral hygiene Neuromuscular blockers  
 Anticoagulants  
 Diuretics  
 Antiarrythmics  
 GCSF  5 granulocyte colony-stimulating factor. (Adapted with permission from Sprung and Kesecioglu.  18  ) 
(including cancellation of meetings not related to the 
incident), policies should be in place about rescinding 
vacations and leave, and documentation requirements 
should be altered to free up time for direct patient care. 
 Nursing Staff :  
 10. We suggest critical care nurse-to-patient ratios in 
an event requiring critical care surge be determined 
by provider experience, available support (ancillary 
staff ), and clinical demands. 
 Increased nurse-to-patient ratios provides improved 
safety and better outcomes for patients.  46  Although 
controversial, high nurse-to-patient ratios have been 
associated with a lower risk for ventilator-associated 
pneumonia  47  and lower mortality rates in neonatal 
ICUs.  48  Patient care is increasingly compromised at 
higher ratios of patients to staff , with data suggesting a 
7% increase in adverse outcomes for each patient above 
4:1 in general medical surgical care.  49  
 However, when providing care during a disaster or 
pandemic, it is not feasible to maintain the typical 1:1 or 
1:2 North American ICU nurse-to-patient ratios. Hence, 
strategies such as the use of care teams with noncritical 
care trained nurses off -loading tasks within their skill set 
from the critical care nurses should be used to mitigate 
the potential for harm. A similar model has been 
proposed by project XTREME (Cross-Training Respira-
tory Extenders for Medical Emergencies) where respira-
tory extenders are employed during emergencies to 
compensate for high patient-to-respiratory therapist 
ratios.  50  Although the benefi ts and limits of skilled task 
off -loading and nurse-to-patient ratios in disasters are 
unclear, there will be a tipping point beyond which higher 
ratios will lead to such poor outcomes that delivery of 
critical care confers no benefi t. Th is supposition has led 
hospitals planning for radiation-related casualties to 
plan a nurse-to-patient ratio not to exceed 8:1.  51  
 Physician Staff :  
 11. During a disaster or pandemic, we suggest critical 
care physician oversight and direction of the clinical 
care teams who provide critical care services, includ-
ing scheduled patient assessment and treatment plan 
evaluation. If direct oversight is unavailable, a means 
of remote consultation should be used. 
 12. Should expert consultation (eg, pediatrics, 
trauma, burn, or critical care) not be available locally, 
we suggest every eff ort be made by hospitals to ensure 
that such expertise be provided at a minimum 
through remote consultation. 
 13. We suggest hospitals consider the utilization of 
technology (eg, telemedicine) as an important adjunct 
to the delivery of critical care services in a disaster to 
serve as a force multiplier to support response to 
disaster events. Where no such systems are currently 
in place, development of a telemedicine or other 
electronic platform to support patient care delivery is 
suggested. 
 Daily patient management by a critical care expert has 
been shown to decrease hospital and ICU patient 
lengths of stay and mortality.  52 , 53  However, it is highly 
likely that in some areas, critical care experts will not be 
available locally. Telemedicine consultation in the 
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 TABLE 6 ]  Operating, Performance, Safety, and Maintenance Features to Be Sought in Stockpiled 
Mechanical Ventilators 
 Ventilator Criteria Mandatory Features Optional Benefi cial Features 
 Operating features  
 Power source AC with battery backup
  4 h duration using standard 
   evaluation of battery duration 
based on (mean  1 1 SD) patient 
requirements for ARDS should be at 
least 4 h duration at: 
 Assist-volume control 
 16-L minute ventilation 
 35 breaths/min 
 15 mL/cm H 2 O compliance 
 20 cm H 2 O/L/s resistance 
 10 cm H 2 O PEEP 
 Low-fl ow oxygen source at 4 L/min and 
   10 L/min 
 Not 50-55 psi oxygen or medical 
   air source 
 1:2 I:E time
Pneumatic operable (as additional 
  power source option) 
External battery option  . 10 h on 
  defi ned battery settings and 
total weight of kitted material 
remains  , 30 lb 
Battery recharge from null to full 
  by AC source within 4 h 
Range of external and internal 
  power tolerances: 
Voltage 
AC: –25% to  1 15% of nominal value 
DC: –15% to  1 25% of nominal value 
Frequency: 
AC: –5% to  1 5% of nominal value 
 US FDA approved for 
   pediatric use
Pediatric and infant approved … 
 Modes of ventilation CPAP volume control (assist/control 
   and SIMV)
Pressure control 
 Control of settings Respiratory rate 
PEEP 
V T 
Flow or I:E ratio 
F IO 2 (on 50-55 psi source O 2 )
Trigger mode 
Trigger sensitivity 
Alternative ventilation modes 
Flow waveform 
 Range of fl ow Minimum of   10 L/min 






PEEP upper limit   20 cm H 2 O 
 Oxygen titration Room air to F IO 2 1.0 on 50-55 psi 
   oxygen source
… 
 Operate without 50-55 psi 
   oxygen source
Able to operate on oxygen concentrator 
   or low-fl ow oxygen source
… 
 Measurements Measure and display inspiratory V T 
Peak inspiratory pressure
Inspiratory plateau pressure (static 
  pressure) 
Auto PEEP 
Expired V T 
 Oxygen sensor Built-in oxygen sensor 
 Performance features  
 Ease to set up/set ventilation 
   settings/troubleshoot
Ability to read screen: 
 At a distance 
 In sunlight 
 In low ambient light
Color coding of connections 
Unique connections for equipment with 
  specifi c functions 
Laminated quick reference and 
  troubleshooting guide 
Software interface to assist operator 
  setup device 
(Continued)
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 Ventilator Criteria Mandatory Features Optional Benefi cial Features 
 Oxygen consumption Time to empty 680-L E tank: 
 Assist-volume control 
 16-L minute ventilation 
 35 breaths/min 
 15 mL/cm H 2 O compliance 
 20 cm H 2 O/L/s resistance 
 10 cm H 2 O PEEP 
 F IO 2 1.0 and 0.5 
 1:2 I:E ratio 
 . 38 min F IO 2  5 1.0 
 . 104 min F IO 2  5 0.5 
Time to empty 680-L E tank: 
 Assist-volume control 
 6-L minute ventilation 
 12 breaths/min 
 30 mL/cm H 2 O compliance 
 Resistance 20 cm H 2 O/L/s resistance 
 5 cm H 2 O PEEP 
 F IO 2 1.0 and 0.5 
 1:2 I:E ratio 
 . 100 min F IO 2  5 1.0 
 . 280 min F IO 2  5 0.5
… 
 Sustained use Documented evidence of sustained 
   performance for: 
 2,000 h 
 Assist-volume control 
 16-L minute ventilation 
 35 breaths/min 
 15 mL/cm H 2 O compliance 
 20 cm H 2 O/L/s resistance 
Documented evidence of sustained 
   performance for (may be a separate 
machine for both 2,000-h 
evaluations): 
 2,000 h 
 Assist-volume control 
 8-L minute ventilation 
 60 breaths/min 
 Compliance 3 mL/cm H 2 O 
 Resistance 200 cm H 2 O/L/s 
Reference contacts for three or more 
   clinical institutions where equipment 
used   2 wk continuously
… 
 Standards … Meets  Standard Specifi cation for 
  Ventilators Intended for Use in 
Critical Care 1 (ASTM F1100-90) 
Meets  Lung Ventilators for Medical 
  Use: Part 3 Emergency and 
Transport Ventilators (ISO 
10651-3) 
 Safety features  
TABLE 6 ] (continued)
(Continued)
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 Ventilator Criteria Mandatory Features Optional Benefi cial Features 
 Alarms Audible and visible alarms 
Disconnect, apnea, high pressure, low 
   source gas pressure
Wi-Fi or similar wireless technology 
  included and demonstrated to 
reliably communicate through 
common hospital patient room walls 
At least one receiver per 10 ventilators 
Receiver is capable of interfacing with 
  any third-party pulse oximeter using 
standard wireless communication 
Visible alarm remains lit until reset 
  by operator 
Multiple types of audible alarms 
  denoting various severities of 
problems 
 Stockpiling features  
 General durability Fluid spill resistance 
Mechanical shock (similar to 4-ft drop, 
   military standard) 
Mechanical vibration 
EMC and electrical safety testing 
Storage temperature and humidity: 
   2 20°C to 60°C, 0 to 95% RH 
Operating temperature and humidity: 
   5°C to 40°C, 0 to 95% RH
… 
 Recalls Vendor must disclose all recalls on 
   ventilator and equipment in the 
past 3 y
… 
 Vendor and support contract Company will continue to produce 
   ventilator model for at least 5 y and 
continue to support model 10 y after 
order is completed 
Able to produce all ventilators within 
   18 mo from order; if unable to meet 
this criterion, estimated ramp-up/
surge period and time frame for 
delivery must be stated 
24 h, 7 d/wk direct phone access to 
   senior-level technician 
Vendor responsible for maintaining 
   call coverage 
Warranty 
Provide any storage life data, if available
Warranty period starts at fi rst contact 
  with patient 
Ability to produce all ordered 
  ventilators within 9 mo of order 
 Maintenance   1 y for battery and all equipment 
   interval maintenance; also include 
battery replacement if needed
All usual maintenance activities can be 
  performed with ventilator in kit 
All usual maintenance activities can be 
  performed with kits in stockpiled 
confi guration 
 Purchasing costs   $13,000 (2014 USD) 
Cost must include kitted ventilator, 
   end-user training program, 
maintenance, and all necessary 
equipment (ancillary supplies) 
to ventilate one patient on both 
50-55 psi and low-fl ow oxygen
… 
 End-user training program Laminated instruction materials attached Interactive training through Internet 
  or DVD, with data demonstrating 
training eff ectiveness (subject to 
evaluator review for merit of data) 
TABLE 6 ] (continued)
(Continued)
Downloaded From: http://journal.publications.chestnet.org/ by a Columbia University User  on 10/21/2014
e36S Evidence-Based Medicine [  1 4 6 # 4  C H E S T  O C TO B E R  2 0 1 4  S U P P L E M E N T  ]
 Ventilator Criteria Mandatory Features Optional Benefi cial Features 
 Kit Rigid case
Weight of kit with ventilator and all 
   ancillary equipment needed to 
ventilate one patient   30 lb 
Wheels provided on case
Weight of kit with ventilator and all 
  ancillary equipment needed to 
ventilate one patient   20 lb 
 Additional approvals/clearances … FDA-approved closed-loop technology 
  included with the ventilator 
(eg, oxygen conservation, 
ventilator-patient interaction 
feedback, automated setting 
modifi cation) 
Full Joint Air Worthiness Certifi cate 
Full Fleet Air Worthiness Release 
Aeromedical Certifi cation Letter from 
  US Army 
 AC  5 alternating current; ASTM  5 American Society for Testing and Materials; DC  5 direct current; EMC  5 electromagnetic compatibility; FDA  5 US Food 
and Drug Administration; I:E  5 inspiratory:expiratory; ISO  5 International Standards Organization; PEEP  5 positive end-expiratory pressure; 
RH  5 relative humidity; SIMV  5 synchronized intermittent mechanical ventilation; V T  5 tidal volume; USD  5 US dollars. See  Table 3 legend for expansion 
of other abbreviation. (Adapted with permission from Rubinson et al.  15  ) 
TABLE 6 ] (continued)
aft ermath of an MCC was fi rst described  . 25 years 
ago.  54  Expert critical care telemedicine consult has been 
shown to improve best practice adherence, lower the 
rate of preventable complications,  55  improve survival in 
sicker ICU patients,  56  reduce hospital length of stay, 
and reduce ICU mortality in general (adjusted OR, 0.40; 
95% CI, 0.31-0.52).  55  
 Facilities that do not usually provide signifi cant critical 
care should be prepared to manage patients in place for 
up to several days until transfer becomes possible. 
Hospitals that routinely provide critical care may also be 
challenged with populations that require more special-
ized care (pediatrics, burn, etc) because the usual 
receiving facilities for these patients become over-
whelmed or incapacitated. 
 Within the United States, only 9.3% of the acute care 
hospitals provide pediatric critical care.  57  Between 20% 
and 30% of the pediatric population lives  . 50 miles 
from a hospital with a pediatric ICU, a level I or II 
trauma center, or a burn center.  58  Th ere is both state and 
regional variation in geographic access to burn centers 
in the United States, and routine referrals to a burn 
center may require hours of transport by ground or 
rotary air vehicles.  59  Similar inequalities are described 
elsewhere.  60 , 61  Under these circumstances, consultation 
with critical care experts at other facilities can contrib-
ute greatly to safe and eff ective in-place management.  62  
Key facilities should be identifi ed and these relationships 
established prior to an event, including mechanisms to 
provide interregional consultation when required. Key 
supply and educational elements required to care for 
specialty populations should be identifi ed and addressed 
preevent. For instance, baby formula and diapers for 
pediatric patients may be overlooked.  24  
 Where critical care physicians are available, consulta-
tion and rounds may be modifi ed and other services 
restricted (clinic, pulmonary, and other nonurgent 
testing) to provide care for critically ill patients. Th is 
may involve off -loading some physician responsibil-
ities onto others. For example, hospitalists may 
provide most of the day-to-day management, whereas 
critical care physicians provide overall supervision 
and input for patients with worsening laboratory or 
physiologic parameters, complicated ventilator 
management issues, shock, or a requirement for 
emergency procedures. 
 Pharmacy Staff :  Medication errors account for more 
than three-fourths of serious medical errors that occur 
during normal ICU operations.  63  During a disaster or 
pandemic, serious medication errors are likely to 
increase because of increased workload and medications 
from alternative supplies or with more than one brand 
name.  64  Pharmacists play an important role on 
interdisciplinary ICU teams as medication safety 
experts.  65  Th ere is strong evidence substantiating 
reductions in adverse drug events when pharmacists are 
involved in the care of ICU patients.  66  A two-tiered 
approach is advisable for the delivery of pharmacy 
services during an disaster or pandemic wherein 
pharmacists with critical care training and experience 
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direct the eff orts of less trained or experienced 
pharmacists and pharmacy technicians.  25  
 Patient Flow and Distribution:  
 14. We suggest decisions regarding in-hospital 
placement of critically ill patients during an MCC 
(aft er initial survey and treatment) be performed by 
an experienced clinician who makes similar triage 
decisions on a daily basis. 
 15. Early discharge of ICU patients to the general 
ward is a complex process, requiring critical care 
expertise. To enable rapid admission of critically ill 
patients to the ICU immediately aft er termination of 
ED/operating room workup and treatment, we 
suggest discharge of ICU patients (when possible) 
during preparation for an impending MCC be given 
priority simultaneous to decisions made about initial 
ED patient distribution. 
 Triage during a pandemic or disaster is intended to 
provide the best care possible to as many patients as 
possible.  67  Awareness of the existing resources and 
alternative resource options as well as prior experience 
 TABLE 7 ]  Methods of Augmenting Critical Care 
Manpower Surge 
 Event Phase Management 
 Preparation Map all critical-care trained staff  in 
  the hospital 
 Defi ne staff  skill sets required 
 Maintain an inventory of staff  skill sets 
 Redesign the division of labor (ie, divide 
  according to the skills required) 
 Cross-train additional staff  
 Teach MCC standard operating procedures 
 Train to integrate with the hospital 
  incident command system 
 Develop situational awareness tools 
 Acute Recall resting staff  
 Curtail nonessential activities (eg, elective 
  surgery and clinic services) and 
redeploy staff  to support critical care 
 Extend working hours 
 Chronic Shelter staff  and their families 
 Mitigate fatigue (ie, ensure rest) 
 Provide transportation services 
 Maintain a safe working environment 
 Provide staff  mental health support 
 Have critical care extenders work within a 
  care team model 
 MCC  5 mass critical care. 
in matching patients to resources enable optimization of 
resource use. Th us, professionals performing daily triage 
decisions are best equipped to optimize resource use 
during a disaster or pandemic. Th e selection and 
function of triage offi  cers as well as the performance of 
triage are described in the “Triage ” article by Christian 
et al  68  in this consensus statement. Methods to avoid 
overtriage during a pandemic or disaster may include 
strict criteria to decrease admissions and facilitate 
discharges as well as cancellation of scheduled proce-
dures. Reverse triage is the main tool used to open 
additional conventional ICU beds.  69 , 70  
 Avoidance of Overtriage:  Imposing strict admission 
criteria has been shown to decrease overtriage. A rel-
atively small reduction of sensitivity from   95%  30  to 
90%  31 - 36  in fi eld triage of individual patients can halve 
the volume of injured patients transported to level I 
trauma centers.  71  Several large organizations thus have 
endorsed prehospital mass casualty triage tools,  72 , 73  and 
rigorous triage criteria have been implemented success-
fully in fi eld hospitals during MCC situations.  74  
 However, during actual mass casualty events, triage 
systems oft en have not been applied and may not 
perform consistently as an isolated strategy to optimize 
the use of existing resources.  75  Th e greatest benefi t is 
gained from triage during a disaster or pandemic when 
it is performed by experienced providers. Th e Royal 
London trauma center experienced 33% overtriage from 
bombing sites where experienced helicopter emergency 
medical service providers functioned as triage offi  cers vs 
85% from other locations.  43  Hence, it is important to 
include experienced critical care physicians in the 
patient distribution process in both accepting patients 
into and transferring them out of the ICU. 
 Service Deescalation and Engineered Failure:  Canceling 
scheduled procedures can provide staff  and space for 
disaster and pandemic patients in operative and postop-
erative areas.  76  However, canceling procedures can have 
potentially negative consequences for both the patients  77  
and the hospitals  32 , 77 - 79  involved. Disasters may reach a 
point where the time and resources invested in certain 
treatments (eg, extracorporeal membrane oxygenation) 
are too great to continue to provide them because 
many more moderately injured patients can benefi t 
from stabilization and prevention of complications than 
can benefi t from advanced critical care interventions 
in the setting of severe organ failure.  38  Deescalation 
and engineered failure are discussed in detail in the 
“Surge Capacity Principles” article by Hicks et al  5  in 
this consensus statement. 
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 Reverse Triage:  Reverse triage is the identifi cation of 
patients for whom expedited discharge is safe and 
ethical. To enable immediate rapid admission of crit-
ically ill patients to the ICU in a disaster, discharge of 
ICU patients during preparation for impending MCC 
should be given priority simultaneously with decisions 
about initial ED patient distribution. Reverse triage 
can be a signifi cant contributor to conservation of ICU 
surge capacity.  69 , 70 , 80 , 81  In addition to the benefi ts of 
improved surge capacity, minimizing patient length of 
stay in the ED through more-rapid admission to the 
ICU may improve patient outcomes. Delays of  . 6 h in 
transfer from the ED to the ICU have been associated 
with increased mortality (12.9%-17.4%) and length of 
hospital stay.  82  Reverse triage requires preparation of 
relevant plans and procedures and a priori staff  training. 
 Reverse triage may not be eff ective in all situations  81  ; the 
more effi  ciently an ICU is run at baseline, the less 
reverse triage is likely to be benefi cial or possible. 
Optimally, there should be daily evaluation of the 
potential for discharge to intermediate or fl oor-level care 
so that when a disaster occurs, a discharge list is already 
available. Availability of intermediate care and fl oor care 
beds is critical to the success of ICU reverse triage, and 
modifi cations of admission criteria to these units should 
be agreed on in advance to permit maximum fl exibility 
in transfers and care delivery. Th e discretion of the 
critical care physician in these times is critical to safe 
and successful reverse triage. 
 Deployable Critical Care Services 
 16. We suggest deployable critical care services be 
considered a temporary alternative to critical care 
when loss of hospital infrastructure limits provision 
of critical care. 
 17. We suggest deployable critical care services are not 
defi nitive critical care facilities but may be used as a 
temporizing measure for delivery of critical care in a 
disaster/pandemic setting. Expansion of critical care 
resources in the hospital environment, with tempo-
rary facilities for lesser acuity patients, is preferred 
over provision of deployable critical care when 
possible. 
 18. We suggest deployable critical care services may 
serve as temporary critical care locations provided 
there is a clear plan for patient transfer, within a few 
hours to days, to a defi nitive treatment location. 
 19. In crisis surge response, we suggest less intensive 
treatment of moderately injured patients be 
prioritized over the deployment of temporary critical 
care services when it would result in improved 
outcomes for larger numbers of patients. 
 Deployable critical care services (eg, fi eld hospitals) have 
traditionally been used by the military but have only 
recently been integrated into the civilian setting in 
response to disasters. Commonly described interven-
tions in the civilian setting include surgical intervention, 
hemodialysis, and treatment of chronic diseases.  83 , 84  
Contrary to military fi eld hospitals, which primarily 
focus on trauma, mobile hospitals, when deployed in the 
civilian setting, should prepare to manage a dynamic 
case mix that may include both surgical and nonsurgical 
patients as well as adult and pediatric populations.  84  
Nursing staff  requirements may be higher than those 
required within a conventional medical facility.  85  
Organizational aspects may be adapted from the 
experience of professional organizations already 
working within specifi c specialties (eg, the Renal 
Disaster Relief Task Force established by the Interna-
tional Society of Nephrology).  86 - 89  
 Although it is feasible to provide life support in an 
austere environment, such as a deployed facility, 
sophisticated critical care is most eff ectively provided in 
a tertiary-care hospital, with a number of supports such 
as consultant subspecialty physicians, interventional 
radiology, surgical services, microbiology, and labora-
tory services, among others. Life support without these 
other services and supports can at best be a temporary 
measure and will not ultimately serve patients well. 
Deployable critical care may be a packaged fi eld hospital 
with advanced capabilities but could also include critical 
care expertise and materials inserted into a hospital 
structure defi cient in these services ( Fig 1 ). 
 Th e most likely application of deployable critical care 
outside the military is in the use of limited surgical, 
dialysis, and other capabilities in an area that has a 
compromised health-care infrastructure; diffi  culty 
transferring patients out; and a large number of cases 
of crush or other orthopedic injury, such as had 
occurred in Haiti  88 , 90  and aft er other massive earth-
quakes.  9 , 83 , 91  Oxygen generation,  92 , 93  potable water,  94 - 96  
water suitable for dialysis,  97  power sources,  31 , 98 , 99  
infection control, and diagnostic support  88 , 100  are all 
key limiting factors in the delivery of these types of 
services. Hospital infrastructure destruction and 
failure during disasters is common.  30 , 31 , 101 , 102  Under 
these circumstances, the use of a deployable critical 
care facility or assets while awaiting evacuation of 
patients or awaiting infrastructure recovery is a 
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reasonable temporary measure. Awareness of regional 
and national assets and their deployment time frame is 
critical for the success of these strategies. 
 Finally, during crisis circumstances in general and in 
disasters involving infrastructure compromise in 
particular, defi nitive care options for critically ill patients 
may become severely limited.  103  When hospital resources 
are overwhelmed, delivery of critical care to a few con-
sumes a disproportionately large part of hospital staff  
and supply resources. Th ere may come a time when 
these resources would be better used for patient stabili-
zation, care, and prevention of organ failure in a less 
seriously injured but larger group of patients. Th ese 
decisions about triaging resources may aff ect select 
patients, treatments, or the entire ICU. Additional discus-
sion is presented in the “Surge Capacity Principles” article 
by Hicks et al  5  and “Triage” article by Christian et al  68  
in this consensus statement, with the ethical foundation 
for such decisions also addressed.  38  
 Using Transportation Assets to Support Surge 
Response 
 20. We suggest surge capacity plans include predeter-
mined standards that defi ne minimal ongoing critical 
care capability in order to defi ne the framework for 
decisions regarding patient transfer as the demands 
on the system gradually increase during a disaster or 
pandemic. 
 21. We suggest priority be given to transfer of assets to 
patients, particularly when transfer of patients to 
defi nitive care is limited by dangerous conditions 
(including considerable risk posed by available 
transportation options). 
 22. Transportation used for patient evacuations may 
also be used to bring in assets (eg, specialty providers 
and equipment), particularly when access/transport 
capacity is the limiting factor in patient movement. 
 Transportation and transfer of critically ill patients is 
addressed in the “Evacuation of the ICU” article by King 
et al  104  in this supplement. Most ground and aeromed-
ical transport platforms can only accommodate a single 
patient and although benefi cial, require signifi cant 
resources. Th ere are also very few critical care transport-
capable crews and units available in a given region. Even 
national assets designed for patient evacuation cannot 
provide true ongoing critical care to more than a few 
patients.  105  In certain situations, appropriate personnel 
and equipment can safely provide ongoing care in 
nondedicated transport units, but there are signifi cant 
issues with equipment not being designed for transfer 
and prehospital use and with training that may aff ect 
patient safety. 
 In addition, according to one estimate, about 7% of adult 
intensive care patients at any given time may be too ill 
to survive transport.  106  Adverse events are common 
during critical patient transports, the most common 
being equipment malfunctions. Interhospital transport 
of critically ill patients has been associated with worse 
patient outcomes, particularly in pediatric populations.  107  
 Given these risks, the scarcity of trained transport teams 
and vehicles for critical care transport, and the complex 
logistics involved in transporting critically ill patients, in 
many cases it may be better to bring resources to groups 
of patients rather than move large numbers of patients 
to the resources. Th e Task Force did not reach consensus 
regarding specifi c exclusions from this suggestion (eg, 
  
 Figure 1 –  A and B, Th e sequence of surge during a disaster or pandemic 
illustrating that critical care services should be expanded within existing 
hospital facilities and that lower acuity patients should be transferred out 
to temporary facilities rather than attempting to provide critical care in 
fi eld hospitals. (Adapted with permission from Rubinson et al.  15  ) 
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situations involving clear danger to patients or staff  or 
infrastructure damage that would preclude continued 
delivery of critical care). However, bringing providers to 
unfamiliar facilities to work with unfamiliar equipment 
also poses risks that should be balanced against the 
advantages of continuing care in place. It is thus impor-
tant to seek ways to augment the surge response through 
use of available transportation assets and concurrent 
planning for dual use of existing transport resources. 
Regional coordination of the movement of supplies, staff , 
and patients in these cases can be critical to success. 
 Areas for Research 
 Demographic data of critical care requirements based 
on the overall population served, specifi c caseloads, and 
ICU cases and needs over time is an area that needs to 
be explored. Methodological assessment of achieved vs 
required surge would rely on standard ICU management 
report forms and data forms per patient. At the ICU 
management and institutional levels, forms based on the 
framework proposed for critical incident reporting 
could be used to study the events post hoc.  108  For the 
individual patient, a well-known tool such as the 
Th erapeutic Intervention Scoring System-28 could be 
initially converted into a required and provided check-
list, with subsequent changes being made as experience 
is gained with data collection. Such forms would ensure 
uniform collection of data on the need for vs actual 
provision of ventilation and monitoring, ICU proce-
dures, and consults. Until such evidence becomes 
available, careful analysis of community risks, facility 
role, and availability of regional resources should inform 
individual facility planning for surge capacity. 
 Conclusions 
 Th e critical care response to a disaster is more prolonged 
than the response in other sections of the hospital, which 
necessitates preplanning and training for staff  augmenta-
tion and redistribution of resources. Th e limits of eff ective 
nurse-to-critical patient ratios in a disaster setting have 
yet to be elucidated, but lower ratios are clearly benefi -
cial. Critical care physician oversight is crucial whether 
through direct or long-distance consult (eg, telemetry, 
telephone), particularly, but not only, for specialized 
critical care. Interregional consultation relationships 
should be established a priori to facilitate such consults. 
 Critical care surge relies on the principles of substitu-
tion, conservation, adaptation, reuse, and reallocation of 
resources. However, it also depends on the presence of 
stockpiles, ancillary services, and regional collaboration 
between facilities. Ventilators and their consumable 
supplies will be the limiting factor when critical care 
surge is required; thus, regional coalitions should outline 
operational plans and coordinate hospital eff orts to 
achieve predetermined ventilation goals. Triage by an 
experienced provider, reverse triage, and service 
deescalation may all be used to minimize ICU resource 
consumption. In extreme crises, deescalation may mean 
prioritization of less advanced care to a greater number 
of individuals over delivery of critical care to a few. Until 
such decisions are made, during temporary loss of 
infrastructure or overwhelmed hospital resources, 
deployable critical care services should be considered a 
bridge to defi nite care. Despite the diffi  culties inherent 
to medical practice in such circumstances, it is generally 
better to convey resources to patients than vice versa. 
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